"Ideal Theory for a Complex World"
Abstract: The modern social world is unjust. It is also complex. What does this latter fact imply about the kind of approach that should be used in ameliorating the injustice expressed in the former fact? One answer, recently put forth by Jacob Barrett, is that ideal theory, which he understands as being fundamentally defined by the identification and subsequent pursuit of an aspirational macro-level institutional goal, lacks a place in social reform. The reason he thinks ideal theory lacks a place has to do with its inability to deal with complexity. Pace Barrett, I argue that ideal theory, suitably understood, can play a valuable role in social reform in a complex world. While some ideal theorists have underappreciated the extent to which complexity considerations complicate social reform, this does not mean that there is no place for it. This paper surveys the resources ideal theory has available to cope with what I call the challenge of complexity. Although the coping techniques will be successful to varying degrees, I believe, in aggregate, a compelling case can be made that ideal theory can combat the challenge of complexity. Still, one may worry that even if ideal theory can adequately deal with complexity, it cannot adequately deal with ever-changing social circumstances. Call this the dancing landscape objection. A static ideal theory cannot overcome it, but a dynamic ideal theory could. In sum, dynamic ideal theory can contribute to social reform in a complex and mutable social world.
"Is Ideal Theory Anarchic?"
Abstract: There has been an uptick in attention paid to institutional questions in ideal theory. The fundamental question concerns whether the ideal social world would include a state. The answer turns on how one models the ideal social world. I identify three parameters of such a model and show that there is no a priori answer to the aforementioned question. It depends, in part, on whether there exist political disputes – or “friction” – between the agents in the model. What generates this friction? Pace a series of recent arguments that suggest that the generation of political friction comes from the presence of injustice, I argue that it is actually political diversity or pluralism that produces the types of disagreements relevant to the justification of the state. Injustice is merely one potential source of disagreement and only generates “friction” when there are also just agents in the model.
"Mandatory Shutdowns, the Ratchet Effect, and the Barstool Fund"
Abstract: Perhaps the most contentious part of the response to the Covid-19 pandemic has been the decision by governments to mandate – or, effectively mandate – the shutdown of certain businesses. The justification for doing so is broadly consequentialist. The public health costs of not shutting down are so great that potential benefits from allowing businesses to open are dwarfed. Operating within this consequentialist framework, this paper identifies an underappreciated set of social costs that are a product of the present public policy that pairs mandated shutdowns with government subsidies. Such policy is prone to being an instance of what Robert Higgs calls the ratchet effect. Given that ratchets tend to be both costly and sticky, it is best to avoid allowing them to come into existence. This paper identifies a way of circumventing this particular ratchet; namely, by replacing governmental subsidies with support from private charitable funds like The Barstool Fund.
"The Prospects of Populism"
Abstract: ‘Populism’ has become a pejorative. Supporters of both Trump and Sanders have been labeled (disapprovingly) populists. This negative connotation predates contemporary American politics. While not the first such use, populism appears as the antagonist of William Riker’s influential Liberalism against Populism. Riker leaves no doubt that populism is the enemy of liberalism, but there is doubt about what this enemy is. The first task of this paper is to perform a conceptual analysis of populism. The second task is to assess Riker’s contention that liberalism and populism are at odds. The final task is to suggest that Buchanan and Tullock’s consensus model of justification is actually a promising possibility for a “populist” means of satisfying the justificatory conditions defended by Riker. What we might call Ideal Populism – which employs an unanimity rule – circumvents Riker’s criticisms. But is ideal populism actually populism? No, at least not as populism has come to be used in contemporary ordinary language.
"In Defense of Strict Compliance as a Modeling Assumption" - https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202041692
Abstract: Rawlsian ideal theory has as its foundational assumption strict compliance with the principles of justice. Whereas Rawls employed strict compliance for his particular positive purpose, I defend the more general methodological point that strict compliance can be a permissible modeling assumption. Strict compliance can be assumed in a model that determines the most just set of principles, but such a model, while informative, is not straightforwardly action-guiding. I construct such a model and defend it against influential contemporary criticisms of models that assume strict compliance.
"Is Visiting the Pharmacy Like Voting at the Poll? Behavioral Asymmetry in Pharmaceutical Freedom" - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10730-020-09414-8
Abstract: Jessica Flanigan argues that individuals have the right to self-medicate. Flanigan presents two arguments in defense of this right. The first she calls the epistemic argument and the second she calls the rights-based argument. I argue that the right to self-medicate hangs and falls on the rights-based argument. This is because for the epistemic argument to be sound agents must be assumed to be epistemically competent. But Flanigan’s argument for a constitutionally mandated right to self-medicate models agents as epistemically incompetent. For Flanigan, agents are different at the pharmacy than they are at the polls. I identify this behavioral asymmetry and advocate a symmetric and realistic behavioral postulate for both arguments. The result, however, is that the success of the epistemic argument becomes contingent which fails to justify a constitutionally mandated right. I proceed to raise skepticism about the rights-based argument as well. I conclude that there is reason to be skeptical that these arguments can justify a constitutionally mandated right to self-medicate. Ultimately, a bottom-up approach to pharmaceutical ethics is preferable.
Review of Daniel Halliday and John Thrasher's The Ethics of Capitalism: An Introduction
Review of Eric Mack's Libertarianism
Abstract: The modern social world is unjust. It is also complex. What does this latter fact imply about the kind of approach that should be used in ameliorating the injustice expressed in the former fact? One answer, recently put forth by Jacob Barrett, is that ideal theory, which he understands as being fundamentally defined by the identification and subsequent pursuit of an aspirational macro-level institutional goal, lacks a place in social reform. The reason he thinks ideal theory lacks a place has to do with its inability to deal with complexity. Pace Barrett, I argue that ideal theory, suitably understood, can play a valuable role in social reform in a complex world. While some ideal theorists have underappreciated the extent to which complexity considerations complicate social reform, this does not mean that there is no place for it. This paper surveys the resources ideal theory has available to cope with what I call the challenge of complexity. Although the coping techniques will be successful to varying degrees, I believe, in aggregate, a compelling case can be made that ideal theory can combat the challenge of complexity. Still, one may worry that even if ideal theory can adequately deal with complexity, it cannot adequately deal with ever-changing social circumstances. Call this the dancing landscape objection. A static ideal theory cannot overcome it, but a dynamic ideal theory could. In sum, dynamic ideal theory can contribute to social reform in a complex and mutable social world.
"Is Ideal Theory Anarchic?"
Abstract: There has been an uptick in attention paid to institutional questions in ideal theory. The fundamental question concerns whether the ideal social world would include a state. The answer turns on how one models the ideal social world. I identify three parameters of such a model and show that there is no a priori answer to the aforementioned question. It depends, in part, on whether there exist political disputes – or “friction” – between the agents in the model. What generates this friction? Pace a series of recent arguments that suggest that the generation of political friction comes from the presence of injustice, I argue that it is actually political diversity or pluralism that produces the types of disagreements relevant to the justification of the state. Injustice is merely one potential source of disagreement and only generates “friction” when there are also just agents in the model.
"Mandatory Shutdowns, the Ratchet Effect, and the Barstool Fund"
Abstract: Perhaps the most contentious part of the response to the Covid-19 pandemic has been the decision by governments to mandate – or, effectively mandate – the shutdown of certain businesses. The justification for doing so is broadly consequentialist. The public health costs of not shutting down are so great that potential benefits from allowing businesses to open are dwarfed. Operating within this consequentialist framework, this paper identifies an underappreciated set of social costs that are a product of the present public policy that pairs mandated shutdowns with government subsidies. Such policy is prone to being an instance of what Robert Higgs calls the ratchet effect. Given that ratchets tend to be both costly and sticky, it is best to avoid allowing them to come into existence. This paper identifies a way of circumventing this particular ratchet; namely, by replacing governmental subsidies with support from private charitable funds like The Barstool Fund.
"The Prospects of Populism"
Abstract: ‘Populism’ has become a pejorative. Supporters of both Trump and Sanders have been labeled (disapprovingly) populists. This negative connotation predates contemporary American politics. While not the first such use, populism appears as the antagonist of William Riker’s influential Liberalism against Populism. Riker leaves no doubt that populism is the enemy of liberalism, but there is doubt about what this enemy is. The first task of this paper is to perform a conceptual analysis of populism. The second task is to assess Riker’s contention that liberalism and populism are at odds. The final task is to suggest that Buchanan and Tullock’s consensus model of justification is actually a promising possibility for a “populist” means of satisfying the justificatory conditions defended by Riker. What we might call Ideal Populism – which employs an unanimity rule – circumvents Riker’s criticisms. But is ideal populism actually populism? No, at least not as populism has come to be used in contemporary ordinary language.
"In Defense of Strict Compliance as a Modeling Assumption" - https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202041692
Abstract: Rawlsian ideal theory has as its foundational assumption strict compliance with the principles of justice. Whereas Rawls employed strict compliance for his particular positive purpose, I defend the more general methodological point that strict compliance can be a permissible modeling assumption. Strict compliance can be assumed in a model that determines the most just set of principles, but such a model, while informative, is not straightforwardly action-guiding. I construct such a model and defend it against influential contemporary criticisms of models that assume strict compliance.
"Is Visiting the Pharmacy Like Voting at the Poll? Behavioral Asymmetry in Pharmaceutical Freedom" - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10730-020-09414-8
Abstract: Jessica Flanigan argues that individuals have the right to self-medicate. Flanigan presents two arguments in defense of this right. The first she calls the epistemic argument and the second she calls the rights-based argument. I argue that the right to self-medicate hangs and falls on the rights-based argument. This is because for the epistemic argument to be sound agents must be assumed to be epistemically competent. But Flanigan’s argument for a constitutionally mandated right to self-medicate models agents as epistemically incompetent. For Flanigan, agents are different at the pharmacy than they are at the polls. I identify this behavioral asymmetry and advocate a symmetric and realistic behavioral postulate for both arguments. The result, however, is that the success of the epistemic argument becomes contingent which fails to justify a constitutionally mandated right. I proceed to raise skepticism about the rights-based argument as well. I conclude that there is reason to be skeptical that these arguments can justify a constitutionally mandated right to self-medicate. Ultimately, a bottom-up approach to pharmaceutical ethics is preferable.
Review of Daniel Halliday and John Thrasher's The Ethics of Capitalism: An Introduction
Review of Eric Mack's Libertarianism